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distinct trend in recent years has been for central banks to empha-
size low and stable inﬂation as a primary goal. In many cases zero
inﬂation—or price stability—is promoted as the ultimate long-run goal
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 1996). Economic theory also stresses
the beneﬁts of low inﬂation. However, in contrast to the current fashion among
central banks, one of the most famous—and robust—results in monetary theory
is that the optimal rate of inﬂation is negative: in many economic models in
which money plays a role, welfare is maximized when the inﬂation rate is low
enough so that the nominal interest rate is zero. Central bankers are certainly
aware of this result, yet they never seriously advocate a long-run policy of
deﬂation (negative inﬂation).
How much welfare is lost from a zero inﬂation policy as opposed to an
optimal deﬂation policy? As shown below, the shape of the economy’s money
demand function with respect to nominal interest rates holds the key to answer-
ing the question. Lucas (1994) argues for a speciﬁcation where real balances
increase toward inﬁnity as the nominal interest rate approaches zero. He ﬁnds
that zero inﬂation is not much of an improvement over moderate inﬂation
but that optimal deﬂation offers sizable beneﬁts. The analysis in this article
supports a different conclusion: reducing inﬂation from a moderate level to
zero entails substantial welfare beneﬁts, and the additional beneﬁt achieved
by optimal deﬂation is small. My analysis is based on estimating a general
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money demand function that nests the one preferred by Lucas. The estimates
imply a satiation level of real balances, which proves to be important for the
comparison of zero inﬂation and optimal deﬂation.1
The original analysis of the relationship between money demand and the
welfare cost of inﬂation is credited to Bailey (1956). I review both Bailey’s
analysis and that of Friedman (1969), whose “Friedman rule” is the famous
result previously mentioned. I then describe informally Lucas’s (1994) recent
work on quantifying the costs of deviating from the Friedman rule. Whereas
Lucas’s work is guided by inventory theory, my own estimates follow from a
broader interpretation of the transactions-time approach to money demand. I use
these estimates for welfare analysis similar to Lucas’s. Although the analysis
suggests that the Friedman rule may not offer much of a beneﬁt in comparison
to zero inﬂation, it does not explain why central banks do not choose to pursue
deﬂation. I thus point out several channels absent from my analysis through
which inﬂation may have welfare effects. These additional channels may help
to explain why central banks seem content to shoot for zero inﬂation.
1. MONEY DEMAND AND THE WELFARE
COST OF INFLATION
Bailey (1956) showed how a money demand relationship could be used to
derive estimates of the welfare cost of inﬂation. He assumed a money demand
function that gave real balances (M/P, where M is the nominal quantity of
money and P is the price level) as a function of the nominal interest rate (R)
and made a consumer surplus argument: just as the area under the demand curve
for any good measures the total private beneﬁts of consuming that good, so
the area under a money demand curve represents the private beneﬁt of holding
money. At a nominal interest rate of 5 percent, since people are willingly giving
up 5 cents per year per dollar of money held, the marginal beneﬁt of holding
the last dollar must be 5 cents per year. Similarly, at a nominal interest rate
of zero, people are not giving up any interest payments to hold money, so the
marginal beneﬁt of holding the last dollar must be zero. At a social optimum,
the marginal beneﬁt to society of holding money should equal the marginal cost
to society of producing money. With the reasonable simplifying assumption that
the cost to society of producing money is zero, the optimal nominal interest rate
is zero.2 In a steady state the nominal interest rate is approximately equal to
the real interest rate plus the inﬂation rate, so optimal policy, commonly known
as the Friedman rule, involves deﬂation at a rate equal to the real interest rate.
1 Chadha, Haldane, and Janssen (1997) have performed an analysis similar to this article
using U.K. data. They emphasize a distinction between short-run and long-run money demand.
2 Lacker (1996) reports manufacturing and operating costs for coin and currency of approx-
imately 0.2 percent of face value.      
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With a nominal interest rate of zero as the optimal policy, it is possible to
measure the cost of any inﬂation rate for a particular money demand function.
Simply measure the area under the inverse money demand curve between the
real balances corresponding to the Friedman rule and the real balances corre-
sponding to the nominal interest rate in question.3 That is, add up all of the
marginal beneﬁts that are foregone by following a suboptimal policy; those
marginal beneﬁts are measured by the nominal interest rate (the inverse money
demand function) at each level of real balances.4 At this point the term “cost
of inﬂation” may seem misleading; according to the theory sketched above, it
would be more appropriate to use the term “cost of positive nominal interest
rates.” Since the former term is so widely used, however, I will stick with it.
Particular theories of money may imply more complicated money demand
relationships than the one assumed by Bailey; for example, the analysis in
Section 3 will involve consumption and the real wage as arguments in the
money demand function. However, it is still the case that the Friedman rule is
optimal, and holding consumption and the real wage constant, the area under
the inverse money demand curve still provides an approximate measure of the
direct cost of inﬂation.5
While the optimality of the Friedman rule holds as long as real balances
are a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate (subject to the caveats
in Section 5), the welfare costs of inﬂation can vary with the money demand
function in two ways. First, the overall beneﬁt of reducing inﬂation from, say,
10 percent to the Friedman rule can vary. Second, the apportionment of that
beneﬁt may vary, in the following sense. According to one money demand
function, reducing inﬂation from 10 percent to zero may generate 99 percent
of the total welfare beneﬁt, with the remaining reduction to the Friedman rule
adding essentially nothing. Another function could reverse this; reducing inﬂa-
tion from 10 percent to zero might generate only 1 percent of the total welfare
beneﬁt, with the remaining reduction to the Friedman rule being crucial for
generating any signiﬁcant beneﬁts. This article is concerned mainly with the
latter issue.
Lucas (1994) contrasts the welfare implications of two particular money
demand functions, both of which specify the ratio of real balances to real
3 The standard money demand curve expresses real balances as a function of nominal interest
rates, whereas the inverse money demand curve inverts this relationship to express nominal interest
rates as a function of real balances.
4 This measure of the cost of inﬂation does not take into account indirect effects of inﬂation,
as will be explained in Section 4. I thus refer to the area under the money demand curve as a
measure of the direct cost of inﬂation.
5 If the money demand relationship involves variables other than the nominal interest rate,
the area under the inverse money demand curve (R(m)) only approximates the direct cost of
inﬂation, because these other variables will generally vary across different values of the nominal
interest rate.      
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consumption as a function of the nominal interest rate. The ratio of real bal-
ances to consumption is used because the money demand functions discussed
here are assumed to apply to long-run data, and in the long run real balances
move roughly one for one with consumption.6 In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, semi-
log, there is a ﬁxed relationship between the change in the nominal interest rate
and the percentage change in the real balances to consumption ratio. That is,
if the nominal interest rate rises from zero to 1 percent, the percent decrease
in real balances/consumption is the same as if the nominal interest rate rises
from 5 percent to 6 percent. In the second speciﬁcation, log-log, there is a ﬁxed
relationship between the percentage change in the nominal interest rate and the
percentage change in the real balances to consumption ratio. Thus an increase
in the nominal interest rate from zero to 1 percent will cause a much larger
percentage drop in real balances/consumption than an increase in the nominal
interest rate from 5 percent to 6 percent. Note that if the log-log relationship is
taken literally, the ratio of real balances to consumption must be inﬁnite when
the nominal interest rate is zero.
How do the two speciﬁcations compare in terms of welfare? With the log-
log function, a slight increase in the nominal interest rate near zero generates
a tremendous decline in the ratio of real balances to consumption. Using Bai-
ley’s (1956) reasoning, there must be a signiﬁcant welfare cost of deviating just
slightly from the Friedman rule. The semi-log speciﬁcation generates smaller
costs of slight deviations from the Friedman rule but roughly the same ben-
eﬁts of reducing inﬂation from, say, 5 percent to zero. Lucas argues that for
the United States, the log-log speciﬁcation ﬁts the data more closely than the
semi-log speciﬁcation.7 Most of the beneﬁts to reducing inﬂation would then
accrue only if the inﬂation rate were made negative, as it would need to be in
order to achieve the Friedman rule. In his own words, “log-log demand implies
a substantial gain in moving from zero inﬂation to the Friedman optimal deﬂa-
tion rate needed to bring nominal interest rates to zero, while under semi-log
demand this gain is trivial” (Lucas 1994, p. 5).
Is log-log demand an accurate characterization of the data? Lucas argues
that it is more accurate than semi-log demand, but is it reasonable to restrict
the search to those two alternatives? Answering these questions requires one
to be explicit about a model of money demand.
6 Lucas refers to the ratio of real balances to income. In his model there is no investment,
so consumption equals income. The model I will use does have investment, and the appropriate
ratio will be real balances to consumption rather than real balances to income.
7 Lucas (1994, p. 3) plots semi-log and log-log functions for various interest semi-elasticities
and elasticities and concludes that “the semi-log function...provides a description of the data
that is much inferior to the log-log curve.”                   
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2. THE TRANSACTIONS-TIME APPROACH TO
MONEY DEMAND
Economists have developed a wide range of models of money, none of them
entirely satisfactory. The models that are most appealing in terms of their
microfoundations—that is, their descriptions of the obstacles that individuals
overcome by holding money—tend to be ill-suited to quantiﬁcation (e.g., es-
timating the welfare cost of inﬂation in the United States). An example is the
search-theoretic class of models developed by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).8 On
the other hand, those models that are easiest to quantify do not convincingly de-
scribe the obstacles that cause individuals to hold money. Examples include the
money-in-the-utility function and cash-in-advance approaches (Sidrauski 1967
and Lucas and Stokey 1983, respectively). A middle ground is the transactions-
time approach, developed by McCallum (1983) and McCallum and Goodfriend
(1987). Their fundamental assumption is that consumption requires time spent
shopping (or transacting), and transactions time may be decreased by holding a
greater quantity of real balances. The analysis in this article will be conducted
in the transactions-time framework.
Denoting transactions time in period t by ht, and the transactions-time
function by h(c,m), the assumptions that transactions time is increasing in con-
sumption and decreasing in real balances mean that ¶h/¶c > 0 and ¶h/¶m < 0.
I make the further assumption that the function is homogeneous of degree zero
in c and m:i fcand m increase or decrease by the same percentage, then
transactions time is unchanged. It follows that only the ratio of m to c matters:
ht = h(mt/ct). Lucas (1994) shows that the transactions-time approach can be
explicitly linked to earlier inventory-theoretic models of money demand de-
veloped by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956). The simplest inventory-theoretic
model corresponds to the transactions-time technology,
h(mt/ct) = · ¢ (mt/ct)¡1 , (1)
where · can be interpreted as a ﬁxed cost of replenishing money holdings.9
More complicated inventory-theoretic approaches can be shown to imply sim-
ilar h(.) functions, with the difference being that m/c would be raised to some
power less than ¡1:
h(mt,ct) = · ¢ (mt/ct)¡1/° ,° 2 (0,1). (2)
See Lucas (1994).
8 This is not to rule out the possibility that in the future, search-based models will be useful
for quantitative exercises.
9 While McCallum and Goodfriend interpreted h() in terms of shopping time, Lucas inter-
preted it as going-to-the-bank time.             
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The inventory-theoretic interpretation imposes strong restrictions on the
form of the transactions-time technology and hence, as I will describe below,
on the form of the money demand function. Speciﬁcally, for the transactions-
time technology, it implies that no matter how high the ratio of real balances
to consumption, there is still some additional beneﬁt to increasing that ratio
further. Lucas (1994, p. 16) defends this implication as follows: “Managing an
inventory always requires some time, and a larger average stock must always
reduce this time requirement, no matter how small it is.” One cannot argue
with this statement, according to a narrow interpretation of what it means to
manage an inventory. However, holding a higher inventory of real balances also
requires increased resources to protect the inventory, a point made by Friedman
(1969, p. 17), who described a shopkeeper hiring guards to “protect his cash
hoard.”
Given an arbitrary transactions-time technology, the associated money de-
mand function can be derived by specifying some additional features of the
economic environment. Assume that individuals face a budget constraint,
Ptct + Mt +
Bt
1 + Rt
= Mt¡1 + Bt¡1 + Ptwtnt + Dt, (3)
and a time constraint,
nt + lt + ht = 1, (4)
where Pt is the price level, Mt is nominal money balances (mtpt), Bt is holdings
of one-period nominal zero-coupon bonds maturing at t + 1, Rt is the interest
rate on bonds, wt is the real wage, nt is the fraction of time spent working,
Dt is dividend payments from ﬁrms, lt is the fraction of time spent as leisure,
and ht is the fraction of time spent carrying out transactions. In a given period,
individuals’ sources of funds are the money balances with which they enter the
period, the bonds they redeem, the wage income they earn, and the dividends
they receive from ﬁrms. These sources fund current consumption and money
balances and bonds to carry over into the next period.
Deriving the money demand function requires knowing what it means for
an individual to hold an optimal quantity of real balances. Optimal behavior
involves balancing marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost. What are the marginal
beneﬁt and marginal cost of holding money? From Section 1, the marginal cost
of an additional dollar is the interest foregone in the next period (Rt); the mar-
ginal beneﬁt of an additional dollar is the decrease in transactions time that it
brings about. This decrease in transactions time is ¡h0(mt/ct)¢
1
Pt¢ct, and the extra
time can be spent in the labor market earning the nominal wage (Pt ¢wt). Since
marginal cost is measured as of the subsequent period, marginal beneﬁt needs to
be adjusted correspondingly: current period labor earnings can be invested in the
bond market, so their value tomorrow is
³
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which can be used to conﬁrm the Friedman rule result: at a nominal interest
rate of zero, money holdings are chosen so that the marginal beneﬁt of an
additional unit of money is zero.
Under the inventory-theoretic interpretation, as mentioned earlier, the mar-
ginal beneﬁt of an additional unit of money is never zero. Combining (5) with
the speciﬁcation in (2), the strictly positive marginal beneﬁt of additional real









,° 2 (0,1]. (6)
The inventory-theoretic approach has appeal, but the implication that real
balances would be inﬁnite at the Friedman rule is extreme and argues for
considering transactions-time technologies that do not share that implication.
If real balances are ﬁnite at the Friedman rule, there is some quantity of real
balances at which the marginal beneﬁt of holding an additional unit of real
balances is zero. That level of real balances—if it exists—will be referred to
as the satiation level. A key proposition, namely that the welfare gains from
low nominal interest rates are concentrated near the Friedman rule, depends
crucially on the assumption of no satiation level; the log-log money demand
function does not have satiation, whereas the semi-log function does.
The log-log function is roughly consistent with inventory theory: assum-
ing that c and w are constant, and noting that Rt/(1 + Rt) ¼ Rt, (6) yields a
nearly linear relationship between the log of real balances and the log of the
nominal interest rate. In contrast, the semi-log function is inconsistent with
inventory theory, as it posits a linear relationship between the log of real bal-
ances and the level of the nominal interest rate. Thus Lucas’s purely empirical
argument favoring the log-log speciﬁcation over semi-log is strengthened by
his theoretical argument favoring the inventory approach. However, inventory-
theoretic models do not offer the only alternative to semi-log money demand.
And the fact that the inventory approach implies inﬁnite real balances at a zero
nominal interest rate suggests searching across a wider class of models. In the
next section, I present estimates of a money demand function that allows for
satiation and is consistent with the basic assumptions of the transactions-time
model. This function nests nonsatiation (log-log) as a special case, but for many
parameter values it is not consistent with inventory theory.                      
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3. ESTIMATES OF A GENERAL MONEY
DEMAND FUNCTION
From (5), in order for a transactions-time function to be consistent with sati-
ation, it must be that for some positive value of m/c, further increases in that
ratio do not decrease transactions time. In (6), under the inventory approach,
transactions time is always decreasing in m/c, so subtracting a constant from the
left-hand side of (6) will yield a technology consistent with satiation. That is, if
h0(mt/ct) = Á¡(·/°)¢(mt/ct)¡1¡1/°, with Á ¸ 0, then the implied transactions-
time technology allows for satiation. Since it will be convenient below to
specify the parameters in a slightly different way, I deﬁne º ´¡ ° /(1+°), and
A ´ (·/°)¡°/(1+°) , so that h0(mt/ct) = Á¡A¡1/º¢(mt/ct)1/º, with º<0, A > 0.
The technology can be found by integrating the previous expression:





º +­ , for mt/ct < A ¢ Áº,
(7)
h(mt/ct) =­ , for mt/ct ¸ A ¢ Áº,
where ­ is a nonnegative constant that represents the minimum possible trans-
actions time. This function is decreasing in mt/ct as long as mt/ct is less than
A ¢ Áº, and the satiation level of real balances is given by (m/c)s = A ¢ Áº.
If Á = 0, then there is no satiation level, and the function is consistent with
inventory theory. The implicit money demand function is given by







which can be rewritten to yield an explicit money demand function:










My strategy now is to estimate A, Á, and º using (9) and to test the hypothesis
that there is no satiation level of real balances (Á = 0). The theory as presented
thus far suggests that (9) should hold exactly. Of course it does not; I choose to
model the error term as additive, but the estimation results do not change sig-
niﬁcantly if the error is assumed to be multiplicative. The data, which are from
the United States for the period 1915 to 1992, are described in the appendix.
Although four separate variables enter (9), for estimation purposes it is sim-
plest to deﬁne the two composite variables, yt ´ mt/ct and xt ´ [Rt/(1 + Rt)]£
[ct/wt]. Then the estimation equation is
yt = A ¢ (xt + Á)
º + "t. (10)                     
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Figure 1 displays a plot of yt versus xt. Estimates of A, º, and Á are found by
solving the following nonlinear least squares (NLS) problem:10
min




yt ¡ b A ¢ (xt + b Á)b º
´2
.( 1 1 )
In general, the NLS estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal, as
shown by Amemiya (1985, pp. 127–35); here I do not make any distributional
assumptions about "t, the residual. Conﬁdence intervals for the parameters
were generated by bootstrapping, which allows one to construct a sampling
distribution without any distributional assumptions and without relying on the
accuracy of linear approximations.11
Table 1 contains estimates for A, º, and Á, along with centered 95 percent
conﬁdence intervals. Although the estimated value of Á is close to zero, the
implied satiation level of m/c is fairly low, 2.674. Following Amemiya (1985,
p. 136), I construct a t-test of the nonsatiation hypothesis (Á = 0). The test
statistic is 26.99, meaning that nonsatiation is overwhelmingly rejected. Using
the sampling distribution for the parameters A, Á, and º, Figure 2 plots the
implied sampling distribution for the satiation level of m/c. According to the
sampling distribution, 90 percent of the probability mass for the satiation ratio
lies below a value of 5. However, the right-hand tail of the distribution is fat;
the x-axis would need to go all the way to 46,000 to encompass 97.5 percent of
the probability mass, meaning that the satiation level is imprecisely estimated.
This imprecision follows from the properties of the data: the lowest nominal
interest rate in the sample is 0.7 percent, and for the observations with the
lowest nominal interest rates, there is substantial variation in the ratio of real
balances to consumption.12 The solid line in Figure 1 shows the ﬁtted values.
10 The presence of consumption in the numerator of x and the denominator of y can cause
the NLS estimator to be biased, as it may induce a correlation between the residual ("t) and x.
More generally, if the residual represents a shock to the transactions-time technology, then in
general equilibrium such a correlation would arise even without consumption on both sides of the
estimation equation. I have investigated these problems by estimating with instrumental variables
using the generalized method of moments (GMM). The GMM estimates are highly sensitive to
the choice of instruments, so I report only the NLS results.
11 The bootstrapping approach involves three steps. The ﬁrst step is to produce the NLS
estimates. The second step is to ﬁt an AR model to the NLS residuals, producing a new set
of disturbances, b et, that are approximately white noise (an AR(2) was ﬁt to b "t to produce b et).
The ﬁnal step is to draw randomly with replacement from the b et, producing N new vectors, e yt,
each of size T. For each of those new samples the parameters are estimated by nonlinear least
squares. Thee yt are generated by combining the xt data and the random draws ofb et with the initial
parameter estimates.
12 Working in a different money demand framework, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996)
have developed a method of estimating the behavior of money demand near zero nominal interest
rates. Their fundamental insight is that if there is a ﬁxed cost of holding nonmonetary assets, the
behavior of individuals who hold only monetary assets at positive nominal interest rates can yield
information about aggregate money demand at a nominal interest rate of zero.                 
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Figure 1 Data and Predicted Values
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  R   x    c￿
1+R      w￿
Table 1 Unrestricted Estimates and 95 Percent Conﬁdence Intervals
b A b º b Á
0.01702 ¡0.7695 0.001399
(6.1 £ 10¡7,0.421) (¡3.31,¡0.20335) (2.5 £ 10¡19,0.0131)
For comparison purposes, I also estimated A and º under the nonsatiation
restriction. Table 2 contains the estimates, and the dashed line in Figure 1
shows the ﬁtted values when nonsatiation is imposed. With money demand
estimates in hand, we can now look at their implications for the welfare cost
of inﬂation.
Table 2 Restricted Estimates: Nonsatiation
b A b º
0.2526 ¡0.2699                   
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By specifying a general equilibrium model, I can use the above estimates of
the transactions-time technology to compute the exact welfare cost of inﬂa-
tion. I use a standard real business cycle model, as in Prescott (1986) or King,
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988), augmented by the transactions-time money demand
speciﬁcation to answer the following question: in a world of constant 5 percent
inﬂation, how much income would an individual willingly forfeit (or require)
in order to live in a world with some lower (or higher) constant inﬂation rate?13
The economy consists of a representative individual who chooses con-





13 For the purpose of computing this welfare measure, I deﬁne full income as the sum of
consumption and w ¢ l, where w is the real wage and l is leisure. The computation holds the
real wage constant at its benchmark level. That is, what amount of additional full income at
the old real wage would give the individual the same utility as the decrease in inﬂation under
consideration?                
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where u(c,l) = ln(c) + Ã ln(l). This maximization is subject to the budget
constraint (3), the transactions-time technology, and the time constraint (4).
Optimal choices of consumption, leisure, bond holdings, and money holdings
imply











ul(ct,lt) = ¸t ¢ wt ¢ Pt, (13)
and




as well as the money demand relationship (5). In these expressions ¸t is
the shadow price of nominal wealth—the multiplier on (3). Since consump-
tion requires a time expenditure, there is a wedge between the marginal util-
ity of consumption and the marginal utility of wealth in (12). That wedge,




mt), is the value in utility terms of the marginal transactions
time associated with an additional unit of consumption. The efﬁciency condi-
tion for leisure, (13), sets the marginal utility of leisure equal to the marginal
utility of foregone earnings, and the efﬁciency condition for bond holding, (14),
describes the equivalence between having $1 of wealth today and $(1 + R)o f
wealth tomorrow. An additional equation deﬁnes transactions time as (7).
Firms produce the economy’s single good using capital, which they own,
and labor, which they hire on a period-by-period basis, according to a constant
returns to scale production function,
yt = at f(kt,gtnt), (15)
where yt is output, at is a random productivity factor, kt is the capital stock,
and g is the exogenous growth rate of labor-augmenting technical progress. In
a steady state, the exogenous technical progress will mean that output, con-
sumption, real balances, the capital stock, investment, and the real wage will
also grow at rate g. Capital accumulates according to
kt+1 = kt ¢ (1 ¡ ±) + it, (16)
where it is investment and ± is the depreciation rate. Since ﬁrms own the capital
stock, they earn rents in equilibrium; those rents are paid out as dividends to
individuals, who own the ﬁrms. Firms maximize the expected discounted stream
of future proﬁts—all of which are paid out as dividends—where the discount
rate for period t + j is the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between a
dollar of wealth in periods t and t + j:








Pt ¢ at ¢ f(kt,gtnt) ¡ wt ¢ Pt ¢ nt ¡ Pt ¢ it
¢
.                    
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This maximization is subject to (15) and (16). Thus the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order con-
dition with respect to next period’s capital stock is





Pt+1 ¢ at+1 ¢ fk(kt+1,gt+1nt+1) + Pt+1 ¢ (1 ¡ ±)
¢
. (17)
According to (17), the decrease in current-period proﬁt that results from a mar-
ginal increase in investment should be exactly offset by the increase in future
proﬁts associated with a higher capital stock next period. Optimal choice of





This completes the description of the model economy.
The benchmark economy has 5 percent annual inﬂation, and the other pa-
rameters are chosen as follows. The real growth rate (g) is 3 percent annually.
The production function is Cobb-Douglas with labor’s share equal to 2/3, and
the depreciation rate, ±, is 0.025. The preference parameters Ã and ¯ are set
so that the real interest rate is 6.5 percent annually and steady-state hours
worked are 20 percent of the time endowment.14 All of the above values are
within the normal range chosen in the real business cycle literature. Given
the estimated parameters of the transactions-time technology, the constant of
integration (­) is chosen so that steady-state transactions time is 2 percent
of the time endowment, consistent with the data presented by Andreyenkov,
Patrushev, and Robinson (1989). The values of the parameters Ã, ¯, and ­,
as well as the remaining endogenous variables, are found by solving for a
deterministic steady state of the system of equations given by (12)–(18), (4),
(7), and (9). To compute the welfare measure, the inﬂation rate alone is varied,
and the new steady state is computed at each desired inﬂation rate.
Figure 3 plots the quantity of full income (deﬁned in footnote 13), as a
percentage of its benchmark level, that individuals would be willing to forego
(would require) to live in a lower (higher) inﬂation world. The solid line rep-
resents the unrestricted estimated money demand speciﬁcation, and the dashed
line represents the restricted estimates that impose nonsatiation. Both speciﬁca-
tions imply that if inﬂation were reduced to the Friedman rule from a 5 percent
annual rate, for individuals in the model economy it would be as if their full
14 The real interest rate, r, is equal to (1 + R)/(1 + ¼), where ¼ is the inﬂation rate. As in
King and Wolman (1996), I assume that the risk-free real interest rate relevant for calculating
the opportunity cost of money holding is 1 percent annually, whereas the real rate that implicitly
enters (15) and (18) is 6.5 percent. The risk premium is not modeled explicitly. In practice this
means that there are two real interest rates in the model, but since both of them are “known,” no
equations or unknowns are added to the steady-state computation. See below for a discussion of
the implications of this ad hoc approach.      
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nonsatiation imposed
unrestricted
income had increased by about 0.6 percent.15 However, the apportionment of
these beneﬁts differs in the two cases. Under nonsatiation, less than 3/4 of this
beneﬁt can be achieved with zero inﬂation, whereas the unrestricted money
demand speciﬁcation implies that almost 9/10 of the beneﬁt can be achieved
with zero inﬂation. While I have argued that nonsatiation is an implausible
assumption, one should keep in mind that the satiation level was imprecisely
estimated. To the extent that one believes the actual satiation level is higher
than it was estimated in Section 3, there would be higher costs associated with
zero inﬂation relative to the Friedman rule than are indicated by the solid line.
While the results are not sensitive to small changes in most of the model’s
other parameters, they are sensitive to the underlying real interest rate. I have
assumed that the real return on capital is 6.5 percent annually and that the risk-
free real rate of return relevant for measuring the opportunity cost of holding
money is 1 percent. Since uncertainty is not explicitly incorporated into the
model, this assumption is ad hoc. The assumption is made because in the
United States these have been the average real returns on equity and Treasury
bills, respectively. Ideally, one would explicitly model the banking system and
15 The magnitude of these welfare beneﬁts is similar to the magnitudes reported in Lucas
(1994).   
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thus endogenize the spread between risky and (nominally) riskless returns. The
assumption of a 1 percent riskless real rate is important for the magnitude of
the welfare cost of inﬂation. If that rate were instead assumed to be 6.5 percent,
then the Friedman rule would involve a 6.5 percent deﬂation rate instead of
a 1 percent deﬂation rate. From Figure 3, this would imply a signiﬁcantly
larger beneﬁt to achieving the Friedman rule. However, the behavior of money
demand at the Friedman rule—that is, whether or not there is satiation—would
remain important regardless of the assumed value for the real rate.
There is a long tradition, discussed earlier, of measuring the cost of inﬂation
by the area under a money demand curve. Here that calculation would have
yielded curves almost identical in shape to those in Figure 3. However, the
area calculation would describe time saving only, without accounting for the
effect on welfare of changes in consumption. In the case of the estimates with
satiation, there is roughly a 1 percent difference in the level of consumption
between the Friedman rule and 5 percent inﬂation. I take this difference in
consumption into account in Figure 3. In general, the area under the money
demand curve may misstate the welfare cost of inﬂation because it measures
only the direct effect of increases in real balances; here the direct effect is the
decrease in transactions time and the indirect effects are summarized by the
increase in consumption. This distinction is especially important in Dotsey and
Ireland (1996), where the (endogenous) growth rate of the economy is indirectly
affected by the inﬂation rate. The direct effect on money demand is dwarfed by
the indirect effect on growth in their model. An additional reason for preferring
exact welfare calculations is that the area under the money demand curve does
not take into account agents’ preferences and thus cannot actually be interpreted
in terms of welfare.
5. OTHER EFFECTS OF INFLATION
The above analysis compares different rates of steady inﬂation in a model where
the only welfare effects of inﬂation work through the demand for money. This
narrow focus was chosen to highlight the importance of assumptions about the
behavior of money demand at low nominal interest rates. However, in more
general models, the quantitative results involving money demand may vary.
Furthermore, there may be welfare effects of inﬂation unrelated to the demand
for money. In this section, I brieﬂy discuss some ways in which analysis of
the welfare effects of inﬂation differs in more general models. The references
I provide are meant to serve as entry points to what in each case are extensive
literatures.
Much of the literature on macroeconomic models with money has involved
nominal rigidities, such as sticky prices. In contrast, the model in this article
has ﬂexible prices. Sticky prices lead to effects of steady inﬂation that work  
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through other channels in addition to money demand. Models with sticky prices
usually involve imperfect competition, and inﬂation can affect the magnitude
of the distortion from imperfect competition. In King and Wolman (1996), for
example, the markup of price over marginal cost—which is a distortion—varies
with inﬂation because ﬁrms incorporate into their pricing decisions the possi-
bility that the price they choose will remain ﬁxed for several periods. While
some have suggested that inﬂation can have beneﬁcial effects on the markup
(Rotemberg 1996; Benabou 1992), King and Wolman (1996) ﬁnd the opposite
effect, as ﬁrms choose a high markup when they set price to compensate for the
deterioration that will be caused by inﬂation. Whether that result generalizes
to a wider class of models is an open question.
A literature beginning with Phelps (1973) extends the type of analysis
performed in this article by incorporating distortionary taxes. Inﬂation, or more
properly, money creation, is a source of revenue (seigniorage) for the govern-
ment. Implicitly, my analysis has assumed that this revenue can be replaced
by a lump sum tax, which does not distort individual decisions. If lump sum
taxes are unavailable, so that seigniorage must be replaced by a distortionary
tax such as an income tax, then the optimal rate of inﬂation in principle could
be higher than that corresponding to the Friedman rule; there would be a wel-
fare beneﬁt to inﬂation counteracting the welfare cost associated with money
demand. Recent work by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996) and Correia
and Teles (1997), among others, suggests that this beneﬁt is small enough that
the Friedman rule remains optimal with distortionary taxes for a wide range
of money demand speciﬁcations. With satiation, however, distortionary taxes
would probably make the optimal nominal interest rate positive, because with
satiation the marginal welfare cost of inﬂation is zero at the Friedman rule.
Feldstein (1997) has emphasized another way in which inﬂation interacts
with public ﬁnance, namely the costs of inﬂation that result from a nonin-
dexed tax code. With a nonindexed tax code, inﬂation raises the effective tax
rate on both individuals and businesses. Feldstein argues that these tax-related
distortions alone cost the U.S. economy about 0.8 percent of GDP per year.
Finally, the steady-state analysis in this article leaves open the question of
transitional effects of a signiﬁcant decrease in the inﬂation rate. These transi-
tional effects would be small in the model used here. However, models with
sticky prices or other nominal rigidities may imply signiﬁcant welfare costs
of a transition to lower inﬂation, with the costs depending on such factors as
how credible the disinﬂation is. Friedman himself stressed transitional issues:
“Any decided change in the trend of prices would involve signiﬁcant frictional
distortion in employment and production” (1969, p. 45). This topic is currently
being studied intensively; see Ball (1994a,b) and Ireland (1995) for examples
of recent work. It is important to note, however, that in contrast to a one-time
cost of lowering the inﬂation rate, the beneﬁt of low inﬂation emphasized in
this article accrues year after year.   
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6. CONCLUSIONS
At positive nominal interest rates, individuals incur an opportunity cost by
holding money instead of interest-bearing securities. Since the social cost of
producing money is nearly zero, there is a divergence between the private
and social costs of holding money when nominal interest rates are positive.
Individuals choose to equate the marginal beneﬁt of holding money with the
private cost, so positive nominal interest rates generate an inefﬁciency. Policy-
makers, by setting the nominal interest rate at zero, and so equating private
and social costs, can eliminate this inefﬁciency. In models where there are no
other distortions, it follows that this same monetary policy is optimal from
a welfare perspective. Lucas (1994) has argued that the form of the money
demand function implies signiﬁcant welfare losses at even very low nominal
interest rates. His conclusion results from his assumption that individuals do
not become satiated with real balances as the nominal rate declines toward
zero. Equivalently, the marginal beneﬁt of holding real balances is positive no
matter how high are individuals’ money holdings.
I have estimated the money demand function implied by a general
transactions-time technology and found evidence that the marginal beneﬁt of
holding real balances declines to zero at a nominal interest rate of zero. In
other words, individuals can become satiated with real balances. My conclu-
sions regarding satiation, however, are vulnerable to the criticism that zero
nominal interest rates have never occurred. Nonetheless, my results imply that
the welfare cost of low nominal interest rates is small. Most of the beneﬁts
from reducing inﬂation below, say, 5 percent can be achieved with price stability
(zero inﬂation), and those beneﬁts are signiﬁcant. In my model a reduction in
inﬂation from 5 percent to zero is equivalent to an increase in consumption of
0.6 percent of output. This result helps reconcile the optimality of zero nominal
interest rates with the tendency of central banks to emphasize zero inﬂation.
Still, one wonders why central banks do not simply advocate the optimal policy.
Probably the explanation involves factors such as transitional costs of disin-
ﬂation. This point aside, it is easier to understand why central banks would
advocate sub-optimal policy if that policy is close to being optimal.       
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APPENDIX
The data used to estimate (9) are annual, from 1915 to 1992. The nominal
interest rate is the yield on commercial paper from the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) database (1915–1946) and Citibase (1947–1992).
I use nominal data for consumption, the wage rate, and the money supply;
taking ratios causes the price indexes to cancel. The consumption series consists
of three spliced series. From 1915 to 1929, I combine personal consumption ex-
penditures per capita in 1929 dollars, with the deﬂator for the same. The former
is series A25 from Kendrick, reproduced in the U.S. Commerce Department’s
Long-Term Economic Growth (LTEG). The latter is series B64 from LTEG.
Both are annual series. From 1930 to 1945, I combine personal consumption
expenditures per capita in 1958 dollars, with the deﬂator for the same. The
former is series A26 and the latter is series B65, both from LTEG, and both
annual. Finally, from 1946 to 1992, I use personal consumption expenditures in
current dollars, divided by population. The former is series GC, from Citibase;
it is in billions of dollars and is seasonally adjusted quarterly data, which I
average to create annual data. The latter is PAN (Citibase 1946–1991), with
data for 1992 estimated by extrapolating the average rates of change from 1990
to 1991; population is in thousands.
As mentioned above, I use nominal wage data. Also, since the raw wage
data is hourly, I multiply by the number of hours in a quarter (2,184) to get
a quarterly wage. From 1915 to 1946, I “reﬂate” total compensation per hour
at work for manufacturing production workers, using the CPI. The former
is series B70 from LTEG; it is in 1957 dollars. The latter is m04045 from
the NBER database. From 1947 to 1992, I use average hourly earnings of
production workers in manufacturing, in current dollars. This is series LEHM
from Citibase. Finally, since the relevant wage variables from a theoretical
perspective are after-tax wages, I multiply wages by the average marginal tax
rates provided by Barro and Sahasakul (1983) and updated through 1992 in the
manner they describe.16
For money, from 1915 to 1970 I use the M1 series from Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) and the Federal Reserve, which is reproduced as series B109
and B110 in LTEG. From 1970 to 1992 I use FM1 from Citibase. Both series
are in billions of dollars and are deﬂated by the POPM population measure
mentioned above. Prior to 1946, that population measure is the annual series
in the Bureau of the Census’s Historical Statistics (Series A–6–8, p. 8).
16 The conclusions reached above are unchanged if before-tax wage rates are used.    
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